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DYNAMIC INVESTIGATIVE PRACTICE 
AT THE INTERNATIONAL          
CRIMINAL COURT 
ALEX WHITING* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The authors in this issue seek to sketch and analyze the practice of various 
functions within the international criminal-prosecution process, in particular the 
functions of the International Criminal Court (ICC). As part of this project, I 
focus on the ICC’s practice of investigation. I identify the challenges that ICC 
investigations face, and then articulate what can realistically be expected of 
these investigations, given the identified challenges. 
Because of the types of cases investigated by the ICC’s Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP), the young age of the court, and the OTP’s limited 
investigative powers, the ICC has no uniform investigative approach across 
cases. Although certain specific investigative practices exist in all cases—for 
example, those dictated by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court
1 (Rome Statute) and good investigative practice (such as the obligation to 
investigate incriminating and exonerating information equally and the 
obligation to protect witnesses)—each investigation is largely shaped by the 
constraints and opportunities peculiar to the situation at hand. Thus, ICC 
investigations are generally reactive, highly dynamic, and unpredictable. Over 
time, evidence can become available or can disappear depending on many 
factors, including political circumstances and issues of security. 
Despite the general recognition of the investigative challenges and realities 
faced by the OTP, a different conception of the OTP’s investigative practice—
one that presumes more control over the investigation itself—often creeps into 
judicial decision-making and outside commentary. This is particularly apparent 
in the long, ongoing debate about when the OTP should be required to 
complete its investigation, with some judges and commentators insisting that, as 
a matter of law, investigations must be completed even before the pre-trial 
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chamber holds the confirmation hearing—the intermediate stage between arrest 
or summons and the trial.
2 
Nothing in the Rome Statute or the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(RPE)
3 compels this result. In fact, as has been pointed out by some dissenting 
judges, the opposite is true: The Rome Statute and RPE appear not only to 
allow continued investigation after the confirmation hearing, but to require it if 
there exist further opportunities to obtain evidence.
4 Rather, the impetus for 
some judges insisting that the prosecution complete its investigation appears to 
be a concern that the prosecution is not bringing strong enough cases, or that it 
is bringing cases with undeveloped evidence, with the hope of conducting 
substantial investigation as proceedings unfold.
5 
These concerns are to some extent valid. There is no question that there is 
room for improvement in the OTP’s investigations, and that the OTP has not to 
date had the successes it had hoped for or expected.
6 And there is also no 
question that the investigative challenges faced by the OTP cannot be a reason 
to lower the standard of proof or undo essential procedural protections for the 
defense. Although the OTP must conduct focused investigations because of the 
limits on its tools and resources, it also has to offer sufficient evidence to prove 
its cases. Otherwise put, although the OTP may never be able to conduct 
investigations that are as comprehensive as what can be done in a national 
jurisdiction, it must do enough to meet the reasonable-doubt standard (or else 
not bring charges). And further, although the OTP must be allowed to continue 
investigating its case as long as there are opportunities to do so, the defense 
must be made aware of the allegations against it sufficiently before trial to allow 
it to investigate and prepare. 
 
 
 2.    See Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 25 (June 3, 2013), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599831.pdf.  
  3.   Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 1st Sess., Sept. 3–10, 2002, Official Records, 
pt. II.A., ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1 (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, RPE], 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/official%20journal/ 
Documents/RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf (setting forth the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence). 
 4.    Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of 
Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Silvia 
Fernández de Gurmendi, ¶ 15 (June 3, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599832.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta (Kenya II), Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Defence Application 
Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related Requests, Corrigendum of Concurring Separate Opinion of 
Judge Eboe-Osuji, ¶ 90 (May 2, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1589189.pdf.  
 5.    See  Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 25 (June 3, 2013), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599831.pdf;  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on 
Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related Requests, ¶¶ 117–123 (Apr. 26, 2013), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1585619.pdf.  
  6.   In cases that have reached final judgment, the prosecution has achieved one conviction and 
one acquittal. Of the fourteen cases that have passed through the confirmation process, ten have been 
confirmed. The prosecution withdrew one case that was confirmed before trial began.  4 WHITING (DO NOT DELETE)  3/19/2014  11:31 AM 
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At the same time, the rigid and formalistic insistence that the prosecution 
complete its investigation before the confirmation hearing is flawed in two 
respects. First, it is at odds with the Rome Statute and the RPE.
7 Second, it 
presumes an unrealistic investigative practice: one that does not and cannot 
exist at the ICC. 
In thinking about the prosecution’s investigation timeline, a more nuanced 
and flexible understanding of the ICC’s investigative practice—one that 
balances the realistic constraints on ICC investigations with the rights of the 
accused—is required. To that end, I will try to identify some of the specific 
challenges faced during ICC investigations to show that the manner in which 
the prosecutor approaches investigations—in particular, how far she takes 
investigations and when she “completes” them—are matters not necessarily 
completely within her control, but are instead a function of the investigative 
tools available to her and the nature of the crimes she must investigate. By 
understanding the investigative process, we can better determine what to 
properly expect from such investigations. 
I will first examine the Rome Statute itself to see what it mandates in terms 
of the scope and timing of ICC investigations before considering the critiques of 
those investigations by judges and commentators. Then I will show how the 
realities of ICC investigations require a flexible approach to scope and timing 
questions, consistent with the rights of the accused. 
II 
THE ROME STATUTE AND THE ICC RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE: 
INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS 
Article 54 governs the scope of ICC investigations, specifying that the 
prosecutor “shall . . . [i]n order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to 
cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is 
criminal responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate 
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.”
8 At first blush, the 
obligations seem broad, particularly given the reference to “all facts and 
evidence.” Further, the provision seems to require the prosecutor to take a 
civil-law, investigative-judge approach, whereby the prosecutor gives equal 
weight to incriminating and exonerating circumstances (though only a mediocre 
prosecutor would not do the same in any adversarial system). 
At the same time, article 54 does not oblige the prosecution to undertake an 
unlimited investigation, requiring only that the investigation cover those facts 
 
 7.    Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of 
Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Silvia 
Fernández de Gurmendi, ¶ 15 (June 3, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599832.pdf; Kenya 
II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related 
Requests, Corrigendum of Concurring Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji, ¶ 90 (May 2, 2013), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1589189.pdf. 
 8.    Rome  Statute,  supra note 1. 4 WHITING (DO NOT DELETE)  3/19/2014  11:31 AM 
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and evidence that are “relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal 
responsibility under the [Rome] Statute.”
9 What is required, then, in terms of 
scope of the investigation? Article 54 ties the prosecution’s investigatory 
obligation to the relevance of the investigated evidence, but relevance is at each 
stage contingent. That is, the relevance of evidence will shift along with the 
substantive standard of proof. ICC proceedings involve three different 
standards of proof at different stages of the proceedings. For an arrest warrant 
or summons to appear, article 58 requires “reasonable grounds to believe that 
the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the court.”
10 At the 
confirmation hearing, article 61 requires that the chamber find “sufficient 
evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed 
the crime charged.”
11 And then of course at trial, article 66 requires the 
prosecution to prove that the accused committed the crimes “beyond 
reasonable doubt.”
12 
So does article 54 merely require the prosecutor to investigate just enough 
to pass each standard-of-proof threshold as she comes to the relevant stage of 
the proceedings (arrest, confirmation, and trial)? The Rome Statute does not 
appear to require any more than this, although as a matter of prudence and 
ethics, most prosecutors will refrain from embarking on an arrest or summons 
until they are sure they will be able to advance through the later stages of the 
process. But what does that mean? Should the prosecutor always have in hand 
sufficient evidence to convict beyond a reasonable doubt, and have 
“completed” her investigation, before even seeking an arrest warrant or 
summons? Is it ever justifiable to have less? Under what circumstances? The 
lines are not necessarily clear. And what happens if the evidence evolves after 
arrest? For example, what if witnesses drop out of the proceedings, or evidence 
that was not previously accessible becomes available—evidence that could be 
either incriminating or exonerating? What is the prosecutor to do then? There 
is no reason to think that the prosecutor’s article 54 obligation to investigate—
and it is an obligation—ceases simply because charges have been brought or 
proceedings are underway. 
Neither the Rome Statute nor the RPE contains provisions restricting 
investigation timing. Article 61 provides that the pre-trial chamber (the body 
that manages the case through the confirmation proceedings, at which point it is 
handed off to the trial chamber for trial) shall confirm charges for which 
substantial grounds have been established, but it does not say anything about 
ending the investigation or freezing the facts or evidence at that stage.
13 Rule 76 
of the RPE requires the OTP to disclose its list of witnesses “sufficiently in 
advance to enable the adequate preparation of the defence,” but it also allows 
 
 9.    Id. 
 10.    Id.  
 11.    Id. 
 12.    Id. 
 13.    Id. 4 WHITING (DO NOT DELETE)  3/19/2014  11:31 AM 
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the prosecutor to add witnesses when she has decided to call them.
14 Article 64 
of the Rome Statute requires the trial chamber to “provide for disclosure of 
documents or information not previously disclosed, sufficiently in advance of 
the commencement of the trial to enable adequate preparation for trial.”
15 In 
practice, trial chambers have generally imposed a cut-off date before trial by 
which all disclosure must be completed, but have also allowed the prosecution 
to add limited additional evidence when the circumstances so warrant.
16 
In sum, then, the Rome Statute and the RPE require the prosecutor to 
investigate sufficiently to assess criminal liability, presumably to the requisite 
standard at each stage of the proceedings, and require that the defense be 
provided with the results of the OTP’s investigation with sufficient time to 
prepare. There is no mandated end of the prosecution’s investigation. In fact, as 
long as there exists evidence that is “relevant” to the prosecution’s assessment 
of criminal liability, continued investigation appears to be required. 
III 
CHAMBERS AND COMMENTATORS: INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS 
The appeals chamber first addressed the timing of prosecution 
investigations in Prosecutor v. Lubanga.
17 The pre-trial chamber below had 
concluded—in the course of articulating rules for disclosure and redactions at 
the confirmation hearing—that the prosecutor’s investigation “must be brought 
to an end before the confirmation hearing, barring exceptional circumstances 
that might justify later isolated acts of investigation.”
18 The appeals chamber 
reversed this holding, finding that, “[t]he duty to establish the truth [pursuant to 
article 54] is not limited to the time before the confirmation hearing. Therefore, 
the prosecutor must be allowed to continue his investigation beyond the 
confirmation hearing, if this is necessary in order to establish the truth.”
19 In 
 
  14.   Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 3, at 26. 
 15.    Rome  Statute,  supra note 1. 
  16.   Article 64(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, supra note 1, requires the Trial Chamber to “provide for 
disclosure of documents or information not previously disclosed, sufficiently in advance of the 
commencement of the trial to enable adequate preparation for trial.” Regulation 35(2) of the 
Regulations of the Court is the vehicle for parties to submit evidence after the deadlines for disclosure. 
Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 5th Sess., May 17–28, 2004, Regulations of the Court, 
regulation 35(2), ICC Doc. ICC-BD/01-03-11 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, 
Regulations],  available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B920AD62-DF49-4010-8907-
E0D8CC61EBA4/277527/Regulations_of_the_Court_170604EN.pdf;  see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Prosecution Request for the Addition of Witness P-219 to 
the Prosecution List of Incriminating Witnesses and the Disclosure of Related Incriminating Material 
to the Defence (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc767521.pdf (setting a deadline for 
incriminating material on January 30, 2009, but allowing Prosecution to add witness to the list).  
  17.   Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal 
Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision Establishing General Principles 
Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence” (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc193057.pdf.  
 18.    Id. ¶ 49.  
 19.    Id. ¶ 52. 4 WHITING (DO NOT DELETE)  3/19/2014  11:31 AM 
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explaining its decision, the appeals chamber said that it 
accepts the argument of the Prosecutor that in certain circumstances to rule out 
further investigation after the confirmation hearing may deprive the Court of 
significant and relevant evidence, including potentially exonerating evidence—
particularly in situations where the ongoing nature of the conflict results in more 
compelling evidence becoming available for the first time after the confirmation 
hearing.
20
 
Although the appeals chamber noted that “ideally, it would be desirable for 
the investigation to be complete by the time of the confirmation hearing,” it 
plainly held that “this is not a requirement of the [Rome] Statute.”
21 In other 
words, the appeals chamber expressed a purely aspirational goal, but not a legal 
requirement, that the prosecution complete investigation prior to the 
confirmation hearing. 
Five years later, in Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana,
22 the appeals chamber 
again touched on the timing of the prosecution’s investigation. The principal 
question on appeal was not actually about timing, but was rather how the pre-
trial chamber should evaluate evidence at the confirmation hearing, given that 
it was generally reviewing witness statements and documents rather than 
hearing live testimony.
23 The prosecution argued that the role of the pre-trial 
chamber is simply to determine whether there exists sufficient evidence to send 
the case to trial and that it cannot, given the type of evidence it is reviewing, 
attempt to resolve apparent contradictions in the evidence or make credibility 
assessments.
24 Accordingly, the prosecution concluded that at the confirmation 
stage the chamber should presume the credibility of prosecution witnesses and 
should resolve perceived inconsistencies in the light most favorable to the 
prosecutor, unless the evidence presented is plainly incredible or unreliable.
25 
The appeals chamber rejected this position, concluding that the pre-trial 
chamber “must necessarily draw conclusions from the evidence where there are 
ambiguities, contradictions, inconsistencies, or doubts as to credibility arising 
from the evidence.”
26 In support of its conclusion, the appeals chamber stated 
that “the investigation should largely be completed at the stage of the 
confirmation of charges hearing. Most of the evidence should therefore be 
available, and it is up to the prosecutor to submit this evidence to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber.”
27 
To support its assertion that the investigation “should largely be 
completed”—which, it should be emphasized, is not the holding of the decision 
 
 20.    Id. ¶ 54.  
 21.    Id.  
  22.   Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Judgment on the Appeal of the 
Prosecutor Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges” (May 30, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1420080.pdf. 
 23.    Id. ¶ 16. 
 24.    Id. ¶ 24. 
 25.    Id. 
 26.    Id. ¶ 39. 
 27.    Id. ¶ 44. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  4 WHITING (DO NOT DELETE)  3/19/2014  11:31 AM 
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but rather a rationale for the holding—the appeals chamber cited solely to its 
decision in Lubanga,
28  in particular its statement that “ideally, it would be 
desirable for the investigation to be complete by the time of the confirmation 
hearing.”
29 
But the Mbarushimana appeals chamber took this language from Lubanga 
out of context, modified it, and completely changed its meaning. Lubanga holds 
that the prosecution does not  need to complete its investigation before the 
confirmation hearing.
30 Mbarushimana changed the aspirational language from 
Lubanga from “ideally” to “should,” thus suggesting that the prosecution has 
some obligation to complete, or largely complete, its investigation before the 
confirmation hearing.
31 But, again, the strict holding of Mbarushimana is only 
that the pre-trial chamber must critically evaluate the evidence at the 
confirmation stage, and does not reach the issue of prosecutorial duties.
32 
Moreover, the appeals chamber in Mbarushimana cited to no provision in the 
Rome Statute or RPE, and no precedent aside from the Lubanga decision, 
supporting its assertion that the prosecution “should” largely complete its 
investigation before the confirmation hearing.
33 
Nonetheless, subsequent chambers and commentators have read the 
language from Mbarushimana to mean that there exists a legally enforceable 
presumption that the prosecution’s investigation should be completed by the 
time of confirmation. In Prosecutor v. Kenyatta (Kenya II), the prosecution 
asked the pre-trial chamber, pursuant to article 61(9), to amend previously 
confirmed charges based on new evidence.
34 The single judge of the pre-trial 
chamber reviewed the Mbarushimana and Lubanga appeals chamber 
jurisprudence on the timing of the prosecutor’s investigation and concluded 
that, “the principle approach is that the prosecutor should be ready with the 
investigation during said phase and any delay in doing so is exceptional and 
should be justified.”
35 Based on this conclusion, the single judge requested “the 
Prosecutor to submit written observations clarifying the reasons for not 
 
 28.    Id. 
 29.    Id. ¶ 44 n.89. 
 30.    Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the 
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision Establishing General Principles Governing 
Applications to Restrict Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence,” ¶ 54 (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc193057.pdf. 
 31.    Compare id., with Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Judgment on the Appeal of the 
Prosecutor Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges,” ¶ 44 n.89 (May 30, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1420080.pdf.  
 32.    Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against 
the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges,” ¶ 39.  
 33.    See id. 
  34.   Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision Requesting Observations on the “Prosecution’s Request 
to Amend the Final Updated Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 61(9) of the 
Statute” (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1546087.pdf. 
 35.    Id. at ¶ 9 (emphasis added).  4 WHITING (DO NOT DELETE)  3/19/2014  11:31 AM 
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conducting the investigation in due course in compliance with the Appeals 
Chamber’s jurisprudence.”
36 
In its response, the prosecution objected to the single judge’s requirement 
that it justify its postconfirmation investigation. The prosecution noted that the 
Lubanga decision, upon which Mbarushimana relied, had found no prohibition 
on the prosecution continuing to investigate after confirmation.
37 
Although the single judge ultimately granted the prosecution’s request to 
amend the charges, she held firm to her view that “continuing investigations 
after the charges have been confirmed cannot be the rule, but rather the 
exception, and should be justified on a case-by-case  basis.”
38 Reviewing the 
Lubanga appeals chamber decision, she reasoned that the appeals chamber’s 
explanation for why the prosecution must be able to continue its investigations 
after the confirmation hearing—the prosecution can continue investigating “in 
order to establish the truth,” because if it cannot then “in certain 
circumstances” the chamber will be deprived of “significant and relevant 
evidence”—was in fact a limitation on these continued investigations.
39 Thus she 
found that the prosecutor could continue to investigate after confirmation only 
if she could show that it was “necessary in order to establish the truth” or if 
“certain circumstances” existed justifying further investigation.
40 The single 
judge concluded that 
continued investigation [after confirmation] should be related only to such essential 
pieces of evidence which were not known or available to the Office of the Prosecutor 
prior to the confirmation hearing or could not have been collected for any other 
reason, except at a later stage. In these circumstances, the Prosecutor is expected to 
provide a proper justification to that effect in order for the Chamber to arrive at a fair 
and sound judgment regarding any request for amendment put before it.
41
 
The single judge’s decision thus brought the law full circle, embracing, without 
any basis in the Rome Statute or the RPE, the approach that was explicitly 
rejected by the appeals chamber in Lubanga.
42 Although the single judge 
claimed to find support for her decision in the appeals chamber’s Lubanga 
decision itself, she in fact turned it on its head. Even if in the end the 
prosecution is not absolutely prohibited from continuing its investigation after 
confirmation, it will still have to justify that investigation if it seeks to amend 
the charges and perhaps even if it seeks to introduce the evidence at trial. 
 
 36.    Id.  
 37.    Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecution Observations on the Conduct of Its 
Investigations, ¶¶ 8–9 (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1549554.pdf. 
 38.    Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Corrigendum to “Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s Request 
to Amend the Final Updated Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 61(9) of the 
Statute,’” ¶ 35 (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1571050.pdf.  
 39.    Id. ¶¶ 35–36.  
 40.    Id. ¶ 36.  
 41.    Id. ¶ 37.  
 42.    Compare id., with Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal 
Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision Establishing General Principles 
Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence,” ¶ 54 (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc193057.pdf. 4 WHITING (DO NOT DELETE)  3/19/2014  11:31 AM 
Nos. 3 & 4 2013]  DYNAMIC INVESTIGATIVE PRACTICE 171 
In Kenya II, the defense objected to evidence collected by the prosecution 
after the confirmation hearing.
43 The majority of the trial chamber found strict 
limits on the prosecution’s ability to continue investigating after the 
confirmation hearing, but struggled to justify these restrictions within the Rome 
Statute, RPE, or jurisprudence.
44 The majority conceded that “there may be no 
formal preconditions for the prosecutor to continue investigating the same facts 
and circumstances after they have been confirmed,” but then nonetheless went 
on to describe limits to such investigative activity.
45 Without citing any 
authority, the majority declared that “the prosecution should not continue 
investigating postconfirmation for the purpose of collecting evidence which it 
could reasonably have been expected to have collected prior to confirmation.”
46 
The majority explained that a prosecution seeking to conduct postconfirmation 
investigation would bear the burden of showing that at least one of three 
exceptions applied: first, that the prosecution “could not with reasonable 
diligence have discovered [the evidence] prior to confirmation,” second, that 
evidence that the prosecution had prior to confirmation had become 
unavailable for trial and therefore needed to be replaced, or third, that the 
prosecution had “justifiable reasons for believing” that it could not conduct 
certain investigative steps prior to confirmation because of security concerns 
that would be ameliorated only after confirmation.
47 The majority found that if 
the prosecution could not justify its continued investigation under one of these 
three exceptions, then evidence uncovered after confirmation could be 
excluded.
48 
In Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, the majority of the pre-trial chamber adjourned 
the confirmation hearing because it found the evidence presented by the 
prosecution to be inadequate to confirm the charges but sufficient to provide 
the prosecution with additional time to investigate.
49 In a section entitled 
Chamber’s Approach to Evidence, the majority explained that it would evaluate 
the evidence at the confirmation hearing with the assumption that “the 
Prosecutor has presented her strongest possible case based on a largely 
completed investigation.”
50 Elsewhere, the majority indicated that it was the 
prosecutor’s responsibility to present “all her evidence” at the confirmation 
hearing.
51 Although it is often said that the confirmation is not to be a 
 
 43.    Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 
64(4) and Related Requests, ¶ 24 (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1585619.pdf.  
 44.    Id. ¶ 119–21. 
 45.    Id. ¶ 119. 
 46.    Id. ¶ 121.  
 47.    Id. ¶ 120.  
 48.    Id. ¶ 121.  
 49.    Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of 
Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Statute (June 3, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/ 
doc/doc1599831.pdf.  
 50.    Id. ¶ 25.  
 51.    Id. ¶ 37.  4 WHITING (DO NOT DELETE)  3/19/2014  11:31 AM 
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“minitrial,” it is difficult to see how the two are distinct if the prosecutor is 
largely obliged to complete her investigation before confirmation and present 
her strongest possible case, or all her evidence, at the hearing itself. 
In both Kenya II (through a concurrence) and Gbagbo (through a dissent), 
one judge of the panel took issue with the majority’s contention that the 
prosecution must complete its investigation by the time of the confirmation 
hearing, finding no support in the law or jurisprudence for this requirement. In 
Kenya II, Judge Eboe-Osuji wrote that 
[t]here is a concern that my colleagues’ pronouncements amount largely to the 
beginnings of drips of dicta that will presently undermine the Prosecutor’s confidence 
in conducting postconfirmation investigations when she sees the need; while possibly 
crystallizing in the future into a hard limitation that will forbid postconfirmation 
investigations, as a general rule, permitting them only in ‘exceptional circumstances.’ 
Such a development is unjustifiable as a matter of law and inhospitable to substantive 
justice. Additionally, its sustainability is highly questionable as a matter of policy and 
practical implementation.
52
 
In addition to noting that the appeals chamber in Lubanga had specifically 
overturned a pre-trial chamber decision limiting the prosecution’s ability to 
investigate postconfirmation, Judge Eboe-Osuji pointed out that the majority’s 
approach would result in endless litigation about whether any “exceptions” 
permitted continued investigation by the prosecution.
53 
Similarly, in the Gbagbo case, Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi 
dissented from the majority decision, finding, among other things, that the 
majority had misread Mbarushimana  to undo the holding of Lubanga: 
“Regardless of the desirability  of the ideal that investigations be largely 
completed before confirmation of charges, I find it problematic that a policy 
objective has been turned by the Majority into a legal requirement, something 
that cannot be done without amendments to the legal framework.”
54 Judge 
Fernández found that the majority’s approach would force the prosecution not 
just to “complete,” as much as possible, its investigation before the 
confirmation hearing, but also to present all of its evidence during the hearing 
itself, which would turn the confirmation hearing into the trial.
55 
Commentators outside the court have also focused on the question of when 
the prosecution must complete its investigation. The Open Society Justice 
Initiative has recognized the potential import of the appeals chamber’s decision 
in Mbarushimana. In an article entitled ICC Judges Demand More, Earlier from 
Prosecutor’s Office it observed that although there exist strong reasons for 
allowing the prosecution to continue to build its investigation throughout the 
proceedings leading up to trial, the Mbarushimana judges nonetheless signaled 
 
 52.    Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Corrigendum of Concurring Separate Opinion of Judge 
Eboe-Osuji, ¶ 87 (May 2, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1589189.pdf.  
 53.    Id. ¶ 99 (“Contrary to public policy, it will merely invite endless interlocutory litigation, 
especially as to what amounts to ‘proper’ or ‘thorough’ or ‘full’ investigation.”).  
 54.    Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Silvia Fernández de 
Gurmendi, ¶ 15 (June 3, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599832.pdf.  
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that they expect investigations to be largely completed by the confirmation 
hearing stage.
56 The Open Society Justice Initiative concluded that “[t]hese 
judicial decisions will require a new approach from the ICC prosecution, 
placing greater demands at the investigative stage, which the prosecution must 
manage within the context of budget cuts and limited resources.”
57 
On good practice rather than jurisprudential grounds, the American 
University Washington College of Law’s War Crimes Research Office (WCRO) 
concluded in a recent report that “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, . . . a 
better solution would be for the ICC Prosecutor to wait until a case is trial-
ready or almost trial-ready before any charges are ever presented to a judge.”
58 
Although the WCRO acknowledged that the OTP can, and often should, 
continue doing some investigation after confirmation, it nonetheless advocated 
that the prosecution should essentially complete its investigation—that is, be 
trial-ready—not just before confirmation, but even before any charges are 
brought.
59 
IV 
THE REALITIES OF OTP INVESTIGATIONS 
The judicial discussion and commentary concerning the OTP’s 
investigations has focused on the Rome Statute and RPE, prior jurisprudence, 
and the desire to have stronger cases from the OTP. Missing from the 
discussion, however, has been any consideration of the realities of OTP 
investigations. Completing the investigation at an early stage sounds 
unobjectionable and desirable, but is it in fact possible? 
It is important to consider this question because the relationship between 
the desirable and the possible is a dynamic one. The ideal requirements of the 
international criminal justice process should shape practice, but practice will 
also inevitably shape the requirements. Although there are minimum 
requirements below which the practice cannot fall—both substantively and 
procedurally—beyond these minimums there is enormous room for variability. 
The question here—the timing of the prosecution’s investigation in relation to 
the confirmation hearing—presents precisely one such opportunity for 
variability. There is no explicit provision addressing the timing issue in the 
Rome Statute or the RPE, and no a priori requirement that the prosecution 
complete its investigation before the confirmation hearing (itself a procedural 
step that is not required by a fair trial). To be sure, there can be debates about 
 
 56.    Alison  Cole,  ICC Judges Demand More, Earlier from Prosecutor’s  Office, OPEN  SOC’Y 
FOUND. (June 5, 2012), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/icc-judges-demand-more-earlier-
prosecutor-s-office.  
 57.    Id. 
 58.    WAR  CRIMES  RESEARCH  OFFICE, INVESTIGATION  MANAGEMENT,  STRATEGIES, AND 
TECHNIQUES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 10 (2012), 
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/ICCReport16.pdf.  
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whether such a timing requirement is consistent with the framework of the 
governing legal instruments, or is desirable for reasons of effectiveness, 
efficiency, or fairness. But these debates should be informed by what is possible 
regarding ICC investigations (itself shaped by the Rome Statute and the RPE). 
The realities of the ICC’s war crimes investigations counsel against an 
overly rigid approach to the timing of its investigations. The ICC OTP faces 
challenges that most national investigators and prosecutors do not. National 
investigators and prosecutors have the coercive power of the state behind them 
and can drive investigations.
60 They have an enormous range of tools with which 
to investigate, and can act both proactively and reactively.
61 Even when they are 
acting reactively, they largely have the power to control the progress of the 
investigation. Generally speaking, they can control a crime scene, obtain 
records, and compel witnesses.
62 The practice of national investigators is mostly 
within their control. They can shape that practice to maximize both 
effectiveness and efficiency, utilizing all of the tools at their disposal. 
The practice of international investigators and prosecutors could not be 
more different. They have no coercive powers and are dependent entirely on 
the cooperation of states and individuals within those states.
63 They generally 
cannot control crime scenes, compel the production of documents, or compel 
witnesses.
64 They are almost entirely reactive, and cannot create a uniform or 
consistent practice. Although some aspects of the investigation are dictated by 
the Rome Statute, RPE, or minimum standards of investigative practice, in 
many ways international investigators have to shape their practice to each 
particular situation. In other words, there is no single practice, but lots of 
practices across all of the cases. 
Four aspects of the OTP’s investigations highlight the challenges of these 
investigations and the potential for variability of practice across cases: budget, 
cooperation, witness security, and the dynamic nature of war crimes 
investigations. Investigative challenges and variability suggest that it will be 
often difficult for the OTP to complete investigations at an early stage. 
A. Budget 
The 2013 budget for the ICC is €118.75 million, which is roughly equivalent 
to the annual budget of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY).
65 The difference is that the ICTY has been focused for 
 
  60.   Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Prosecuting Massive Crimes with Primitive Tools: Three 
Difficulties Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal Proceedings, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
403, 405–06 (2004) (cataloguing powers of national authorities to investigate crime).  
 61.    Id. 
 62.    Id. 
 63.    Id. at 406; Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can be Justice 
Delivered, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 335–40 (2009) (exploring challenges to international investigations 
and prosecutions).  
  64.   Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 60; Whiting, supra note 63.  
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twenty years on three related wars in one region, while the ICC is presently 
investigating in eight different situation countries.
66 
Some commentators correctly identify the ICC budget as a cause of 
deficient investigations, but then go on to suggest that the limited budget is 
somehow the responsibility of the OTP. For example, the American University 
Washington College of Law’s WCRO suggests that the limited budget has been 
driven by the prosecutor’s “small team” approach to investigations and 
recommends that “the OTP may want to reconsider its small team approach 
and recruit more investigators.”
67 Although few within the OTP would object to 
the bottom-line recommendation, the WCRO has the cause and effect precisely 
backwards. There has been no hint from the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) 
of a willingness to increase dramatically the budget of the ICC, and in fact in 
recent years the ASP has reduced the budget or held it at no growth, despite 
requests at times for additional resources.
68 Although there remains hope that 
the ASP will increase the OTP’s budget in future years, nobody anticipates 
astronomical increases.
69 
 
 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. S.C. Res. 808, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993) (establishing the ICTY). For the budget, compare Int’l Criminal 
Court, Assembly of States Parties, 11th Sess., Nov. 14–22, 2012, Proposed Programme Budget for 2013 
of the International Criminal Court, ¶ 2, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/11/10 (Aug. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-10-ENG.pdf [hereinafter Int’l Criminal 
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2001 in the former Yugoslavia).  
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2013 10:15 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/20/us-kenya-icc-investigations-
idUSBRE98J0HY20130920 (indicating that OTP unlikely to get full budget increase it is seeking); 
Blake Evans-Pritchard, Mali Case Throws Spotlight on ICC Budget Constraints, INST. FOR WAR & 
PEACE  REPORTING (Aug. 6 2012), http://iwpr.net/report-news/mali-case-throws-spotlight-icc-budget-
constraints (“The latest report from the budget committee of the Assembly of States Parties, the ICC’s 
governing body, recognises that the court needs more money to meet these additional expenses. 
Despite this, some member states are still reluctant to loosen the purse-strings.”); see also William W. 
Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the 
Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 54 (2008) (“Neither the legal mandate of 
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The budget and size of the court are a design reality of the ICC. States have 
deliberately designed the ICC to be a relatively small institution with a limited 
ability to investigate and prosecute cases.
70 This design is in keeping with the 
complementarity principle embedded in the structure of the court: the ambition 
of the ICC is to spur states to prosecute their own cases rather than having the 
ICC prosecute those cases.
71 In addition, the limited size and powers of the 
court no doubt reflect a certain ambivalence on the part of many states towards 
the project itself.
72 As Antonio Cassese has written, because of the stranglehold 
of the principle of sovereignty, “[s]tates have established international criminal 
courts and granted them authority to judge crimes of individuals—but they have 
stopped short of backing up this authority with all the enforcement tools 
required to make it fully operational.”
73 
So how does the budget affect the OTP’s investigations? Plainly it affects 
the number of investigators that can be assigned to any one particular case at a 
time. The WCRO notes in its report that the OTP has approximately forty-four 
investigators, and that there were at most twelve investigators assigned to the 
Lubanga case (which is, in fact, a typical number of investigators assigned to a 
case).
74 Further, it should be clear that this number of investigators would not 
change much even if the OTP dramatically reduced the number of situation 
countries in which it is investigating. The reality is that although the court is 
currently investigating in eight situation countries, it must focus its most intense 
investigations on just a few countries at a time.
75 Thus, even if the court reduced 
the number of situation countries, it is likely that it would nonetheless always be 
actively investigating several countries at once. Simply by doing the math, it 
becomes clear that there will be a limited number of investigators for each case 
at any given time. 
Moreover, the limited budget might also affect the timing of investigations. 
If the prosecutor has a limited budget and faces multiple investigations with 
uncertain futures, then she will prioritize and focus on those investigations that 
 
 70.    See Burke-White, supra note 69, at 60–61, 64–67 (noting that the ICC was designed to have 
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 73.    Antonio  Cassese,  Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 271, 273 
(2011).  
 74.    WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, supra note 58, at 24.  
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seem the most urgent or the most likely to move forward. As set forth in more 
detail below, the prosecutor is faced with a host of investigative options at any 
given time. There will be some investigable cases that are graver than others. 
There will be some where the crimes are ongoing, and therefore where there is 
pressure to act quickly in order to help stop the crimes. There will be cases 
where there is a greater likelihood to apprehend the accused than in other 
cases, and there will also be some cases with more international support (and 
therefore more investigative opportunities) than others. At each moment the 
prosecutor must calculate which case investigations are most urgent and most 
likely to advance, so that she can focus her resources there. 
But these decisions are just educated guesses, and they can be based on 
shifting information. Take as a snapshot, for example, February 2011. Towards 
the end of 2010, the prosecutor brought a new case in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC) against Callixte Mbarushimana and two significant cases 
in Kenya against six accused.
76 In December 2010, serious postelection violence 
broke out in Côte d’Ivoire, a country that the OTP was monitoring in a 
preliminary examination phase.
77 These events in Côte d’Ivoire led, in April 
2011, to Laurent Gbagbo falling from power and his opponent, Alassane 
Ouattara, taking control of the government and renewing a request to the ICC 
to take jurisdiction and investigate crimes in the country.
78 
Then, on February 26, 2011, the UN Security Council unexpectedly and 
unanimously referred the unfolding situation in Libya to the International 
Criminal Court.
79 Although the OTP could supplement the budget with an 
application for more funds from the contingency fund, getting that money takes 
time and the OTP still had to face thebudget constraints described above. 
What to do? The situation in Libya was unfolding and urgent, and the eyes 
of the international community were on the court to see how it would react. A 
significant investigative commitment was required, and potential witnesses were 
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cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc954979.pdf.  
 77.    See Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Case No. ICC-02/11, Decision on the 
“Prosecution’s Provision of Further Information Regarding Potentially Relevant Crimes Committed 
between 2002 and 2010,” ¶¶ 16–19 (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1341467.pdf; 
Adam Nossiter, Hundreds of Thousands Flee Ivory Coast Crisis, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, 
at A4. 
 78.    See Adam Nossiter, Scott Sayare & Dan Bilefsky, Leader’s Arrest in Ivory Coast Ends 
Standoff, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2011, at A1; see also Letter from Alassane Ouattara, President of Côte 
d’Ivoire, to the President of the Int’l Criminal Court (Dec. 14, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
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fleeing Libya, offering ample investigative opportunities.
80 In time, a major 
investigative commitment would also be required in Côte d’Ivoire.
81 At the 
same time, the office had to continue to build its cases in Kenya and in the 
DRC. Throughout the year, therefore, the OTP had to constantly shift 
resources around among these various priorities in order to try to conduct 
sufficient investigations in each.
82 And during the year, events would change and 
develop, forcing the office to rethink its investigative strategy and 
commitments. As mentioned above, in April 2011 the government changed in 
Côte d’Ivoire and the need to investigate became more pressing. In August 
2011, the Gaddafi regime fell and Muammar Gaddafi himself was killed.
83 
Shortly thereafter, in November 2011, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, who by then had 
been charged by the ICC with crimes against humanity, was captured in Libya 
and the Libyan government indicated that it would itself seek to try the junior 
Gaddafi.
84 These significant events all required the office to react and to rethink 
whether to continue on its present course or to shift resources around to more 
urgent priorities. 
Meanwhile, the OTP had a number of cases in the DRC and Uganda where 
there were outstanding arrest warrants and uncertain prospects of arrest.
85 
Could the prosecutor afford to continue to spend additional investigative 
resources on those cases to ensure that the evidence remained current and 
fresh? Over time, after all, witnesses might lose interest or even pass away. But 
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the prosecutor will not likely be able to justify devoting resources to these 
dormant cases, even though an arrest can occur at any time. In fact, on March 
18, 2013, Bosco Ntaganda, who had been a fugitive from the court for nearly 
seven years, unexpectedly surrendered himself to the U.S. Embassy in Kigali, 
Rwanda, asking to go to the ICC.
86 Suddenly the office was forced to begin 
reexamining its evidence in that case to ensure that the evidence was still 
available, and to see whether a new investigation would be necessary. 
The point is that with a limited budget and uncertain and changing 
investigative needs, the Prosecutor must constantly react to shifting priorities 
and opportunities. She has limited control over her own agenda and work. She 
must not only predict where to focus her resources but also be prepared to shift 
those resources when circumstances change. Sometimes the prosecutor will be 
ahead of the curve, while other times she will have to play catch up, such as 
when unexpected developments occur. As a result, cases will end up in different 
stages of development, depending on many factors, one of them being the 
resources available at any given time to investigate each case. 
How does this shape investigative practice? The limited budget and 
unpredictable circumstances mean that the practice must be flexible. Sometimes 
the OTP will have both the resources and the opportunities to investigate 
deeply and thoroughly. In other cases it will be more constrained. If resources 
restrict the prosecution to focused investigation, but a unique opportunity for 
arrest nonetheless arises, the office might feel compelled to move and to try to 
bolster the investigation later. In other cases, because of a lapse of time 
between the investigation and the arrest, the office might again have to 
supplement its original investigation. In sum, the OTP’s limited resources make 
it extremely difficult for the office to have one set investigative approach in all 
of its cases. 
B. Witness  Protection 
Article 68 of the Rome Statute mandates that “[t]he Court shall take 
appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-
being, dignity, and privacy of victims and witnesses.”
87 This provision has been 
interpreted to compel the court to provide appropriate protection to any person 
who is put at risk as a result of his or her interaction with the court.
88 Witness 
protection requires a careful assessment of the risks faced by the prospective 
witness in the moment, as well as those that might be faced as future 
developments unfold. 
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ICC witness-protection requirements are particularly acute, even more so 
than most of those at the ad hoc tribunals (those tribunals established to 
prosecute cases from one particular conflict, such as the tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda). As a permanent institution, the ICC is designed to 
react quickly and to investigate events shortly after they occur, or even as they 
are still unfolding. The cases investigated by the ICC are generally borne of 
intense political and social upheavals where violence becomes the norm.
89 Thus 
the ICC will often be investigating in the context of general instability and 
breakdown, with no expectation that national structures will be able to protect 
witnesses. Further, because the ICC must focus its efforts on the most 
responsible suspects, there will be an intense interest by those suspects to 
frustrate the work of the court.
90 The cost of any failure to protect witnesses will 
be high, not just to the witnesses at issue but to the work of the court as well. 
At the same time, witness protection is extraordinarily expensive, as much 
to the witness and his or her family as it is to the court. In many cases, witness 
protection requires out-of-country relocation of the witness and his or her 
family. Relocation places an enormous burden on witnesses. Some contend that 
in poorer countries where the ICC investigates, relocation is actually a positive 
benefit that may cause some witnesses to fabricate their stories.
91 That is no 
doubt true in some cases. But in many cases, witness relocation is an enormous 
sacrifice and hardship for the witness. Often witnesses are forced to leave their 
home countries with little prospect of returning, and to go to an unfamiliar 
country where they must completely rebuild their lives.
92 And for the court, 
moving a witness and his or her family out of one country into a new one 
requires significant resources. 
Because of the costs of witness protection (to both court and witness), the 
OTP will always prioritize nonwitness evidence (documents, video, recordings, 
and so forth) and will look for witnesses who have already made themselves 
safe (generally through their own relocations).
93 But the reality is that in many 
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 91.    See, e.g., Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing 
Brief, ¶¶ 505–11 (June 29, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1436184.pdf (contending that 
credibility of relocated witnesses must be carefully scrutinized). 
 92.    See C HRIS  MAHONEY,  THE  JUSTICE  SECTOR  AFTERTHOUGHT:  WITNESS  PROTECTION IN 
AFRICA 43–44 (2010), available at http://www.issafrica.org/siteimages/WitnessProt.pdf (noting that the 
relocation process is “cumbersome” and can have an impact on the well-being of witnesses).  
 93.    OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, FIRST REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO UNSCR 1970 (2011) ¶ 44 (2011) 
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cases there exists very little nonwitness evidence, or if it exists it is not 
accessible or available.
94 The reality of the investigative practice at the ICC is 
that witnesses have been, and likely will continue to be, at the center of nearly 
all cases at the ICC.
95 Moreover, because the ICC sits far from the sites of the 
crimes it considers, it will necessarily depend heavily on “insider” witnesses who 
have relationships with suspects that allow the witnesses to provide critical 
information about those suspects.
96 Such witnesses are particularly at risk—
because they are generally associated and allied with the suspected 
perpetrators, and their testimony will be perceived as a particular betrayal and 
especially threatening—and therefore almost always require significant 
protection. 
Because of the protection challenges, the OTP has always sought to keep its 
investigations narrow and to rely on as few witnesses as possible.
97 The OTP is 
also extremely cautious about whom it interviews because even interviewing a 
person can subject him or her to risk, such that the person requires protection.
98 
Therefore, the office takes steps, including the screening of witnesses before 
interview, to ensure that it only interviews individuals with relevant 
information.
99 Of course the prosecution has to develop sufficient evidence to 
prove its case (itself a judgment call), but how deep a bench of additional 
witnesses should it have? What is a “complete” investigation under these 
circumstances? 
 
Office seeks to rely on the smallest number of witnesses necessary to prove its case by conducting 
focused investigations and by prioritizing the use of documentary and physical evidence. To the extent 
that the Office relies on evidence from witnesses, it prioritizes witnesses who reside in safe areas.”). 
 94.    INT’L BAR ASSOCIATION, WITNESSES BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 18 
(2013) (noting the difficulty of obtaining nonwitness evidence); Patricia M. Wald, Dealing with 
Witnesses in War Crime Trials: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 
217, 218–19 (2002) (noting that ICTY cases are different from the Nuremberg trials insofar as in the 
former there is no paper trail and no heavy reliance on witnesses); Whiting, supra note 63, at 338 n.72, 
348 (noting that, in modern conflicts, perpetrators take steps to insure that crimes are not documented). 
 95.    INT’L  BAR  ASSOCIATION,  supra note 94, at 12, 14 (“The ICC relies extensively on direct 
witness testimony in order to function effectively.”).  
 96.    Whiting,  supra note 63, at 348 (critical role of insider witnesses).  
 97.    MAHONEY, supra note 92.  
 98.    Id. ¶ 43 (“The Office’s mandate of protection is established by Article 68(1) of the Statute and 
extends to those persons who are at risk on account of their interactions with the Office. This includes 
witnesses, screened individuals and their immediate family members, intermediaries, sources, and staff 
members of the Office.”). 
 99.    See Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Public Redacted version of “Decision on 
the Defence Request for Disclosure of Pre-Interview Assessments and the Consequences of Non-
Disclosure,” ¶¶ 18, 31 (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc857694.pdf (“Pursuant to 
Article 54 of the Statute, the prosecution argues that conducting a pre-interview assessment with a 
witness is a strategic, prosecutorial undertaking that should not be subject to scrutiny by the defence. . . 
. Screening notes . . . are the result of a preliminary procedure, conducted prior to taking a statement, 
during which the individual is assessed so that a decision can be made as to whether or not a statement 
is to be taken.”); Interview by Tony Jones with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court 
(Aug. 6, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2007/s1998168.htm) 
(“Because I have a duty to protect my witness I never went to Darfur to collect witness. So I had to 
screen witness in 17 countries around the world, and I choose 100 of them and I’m protecting them, 
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Moreover, in many cases, the chances of arresting the accused are uncertain. 
This means that the OTP will be cautious about taking on too many witnesses 
before arrest.
100 But then, once the arrest occurs, there can be a scramble to find 
and secure additional witnesses, a process that may not be complete by the time 
that the confirmation hearing arrives. Further, much can change with witnesses 
as time passes, whether before arrest or during the period between arrest and 
confirmation (or even after confirmation). Witnesses can become intimidated, 
they can lose interest, they can become less reliable, or they can have their 
weaknesses exposed. And at no time can the prosecution compel witnesses to 
come to the court and testify.
101 Even when witnesses and their families have 
been relocated at considerable expense, they can refuse to come before the 
court. And even when witnesses do testify, they will sometimes change their 
testimony or they will make a different impression on the judges than the 
prosecution expects. Given all of these uncertain factors, how many witnesses is 
enough? When has the prosecution done enough investigation? 
These witness-protection realities require careful judgments by the 
prosecution. It cannot interview and protect endless numbers of witnesses, but 
it cannot take the risk of relying on too few either. Inevitably, however, witness-
protection challenges will require continuing investigation and adjustments to 
the prosecution’s evidence. It is hard to imagine that the prosecution could ever 
have a big enough reserve of witnesses on all key points to never have to 
conduct further investigations. The costs of such an approach would simply be 
too high. Besides, the prosecution must reserve resources for potential new 
witnesses. As time passes, witnesses who might have been unavailable or 
unwilling to cooperate at the early stages of the investigation may become 
available if the risks evolve or diminish. These new witnesses might offer better, 
more precise, or more complete information that should come before the court. 
At some point or another, therefore, it is almost certain that the prosecution 
will have to bolster its case by replacing witnesses who disappear or become 
unwilling or unreliable. It is equally certain that the prosecution will at some 
point want to supplement its case with the testimony of witnesses who were 
previously unavailable. This, in turn, means that the prosecution must continue 
its investigation both before and after the confirmation hearing. 
C. Cooperation 
As is well known, the OTP relies on the cooperation of other actors—
principally states as well as international and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs)—to investigate its cases.
102 Although it has investigators who work for 
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the OTP, they are dependent on the help of others to do their work. The OTP 
investigators are free to accept evidence that is voluntarily provided (including 
witness statements and documentary evidence), but even then they require the 
permission of relevant states to travel to collect the information.
103 In particular, 
if a situation country chooses not to cooperate with the OTP, or to cooperate 
incompletely, it can have dramatic consequences for the ability of the OTP to 
investigate. 
The cooperation regime is set forth in part IX of the Rome Statute.
104 The 
cooperation of States Parties with the work of the court is, for the most part, 
mandatory. Article 86 establishes a general obligation to cooperate, stating that 
“States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate 
fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.”
105 Article 93 sets out a list of mandatory forms of 
cooperation, including identifying the location of persons and items, taking 
evidence, examining locations, providing documents, and executing searches 
and seizures.
106 
The difficulty, however, is not with the specified forms of cooperation, but 
rather with the enforcement. If states do not cooperate, or, as is more often the 
case, they cooperate in form but not in substance, then the only recourse 
available to the prosecutor is to raise the matter with the chamber. The judges 
can make a finding of noncooperation pursuant to article 87(7) and then “refer 
the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council 
referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council.”
107 This process offers 
an opportunity for other states to exert pressure on a noncompliant state, but it 
is hardly a sure way to obtain cooperation. The reality is that if states do not 
find it in their own interest to cooperate with the court and are not pressured by 
other actors in the international community who have the ability to exert 
pressure, then the OTP will be forced to find ways around the noncooperation. 
Because cooperation is tied to state interests, it is rarely static. States can 
become cooperative after refusing to help, or can suddenly stop providing 
assistance after having been cooperative. In the former Yugoslavia, both 
Croatia and Serbia were initially reluctant to cooperate with the ICTY, but 
were later persuaded by pressure from the United States and the European 
Union to do so.
108 At the ICC, the government of Sudan has provided almost no 
cooperation to the court.
109 Kenya initially pledged to be cooperative with the 
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prosecutor’s investigation of postelection violence there, but cooperation 
slowed once significant actors in the country were charged.
110 When the UN 
Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, there was 
considerable interest and support from many countries that were willing to 
assist in the investigation.
111 Once the war ended and Gaddafi fell, however, the 
interest of these states diminished.
112 
The prosecution must both plan for the possibility that cooperation will 
disappear (which can also have an impact on witness security for those 
witnesses who remain within the situation country) and find ways to take 
advantage of cooperation opportunities that might arise. And it is rarely so 
simple as a matter of one country’s cooperation or noncooperation. The 
investigations of the OTP focus always on one situation country, but the 
opportunities to gather evidence generally span many countries.
113 And states 
will sometimes be willing to cooperate on some aspects of an investigation, but 
not others.
114 
Because cooperation is largely outside the control of the office and is highly 
variable and unpredictable, the investigative practice of the office must adjust to 
different circumstances. When there is cooperation, the office will identify and 
interview witnesses and collect nonwitness evidence that may be available. 
When cooperation is limited, the investigators will have to become more 
creative in their search for evidence. If the situation country refuses to 
cooperate, for example, then the office will search for witnesses who have left 
the country voluntarily or will seek evidence collected by other parties with 
better access to the country. 
In sum, the ability to investigate and to obtain information and evidence can 
be extremely variable in any given point in time, and is also constantly in flux. 
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251–52 (2012).  
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(support from multiple states in Libya investigation); Interview by Tony Jones with Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, supra note 99 (discussing the screening of Darfur witnesses 
in 17 countries). 
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This reality is yet another reason why it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to finalize an investigation in any given point in time. 
D. Dynamic  Investigations 
At any given time, the prosecutor has to consider and weigh all of the 
different variables when deciding where to investigate, what resources to 
dedicate, how fast to go, when there is enough evidence, and when to move to 
the next phase. To employ a cliché, planning and conducting an investigation at 
the ICC is like playing three-dimensional, or even four- or five-dimensional, 
chess. And to add to the factors that the prosecutor must consider, situation 
countries and the significant actors therein (including potential accused and 
witnesses) are themselves frequently in a state of flux (and may be taking steps 
to actively thwart the OTP’s investigations). 
The politics of a country that is in conflict, or is emerging from conflict, can 
change dramatically and quickly, affecting all those who are deeply embedded 
in political structures, with significant consequences for the investigation itself. 
And as noted above, unlike most domestic prosecutors (or investigating 
judges), prosecutors at the ICC have very few tools with which to control the 
variables they confront. They cannot lock down testimony, they cannot compel 
witnesses, and they cannot easily obtain nonwitness evidence (through, for 
example, wiretaps, document subpoenas, surveillance, and so forth). 
Moreover, there is often a dynamic relationship between the ICC and the 
investigation itself. The progress of an investigation may have an influence on 
the willingness of witnesses to participate. For many, cooperating with an ICC 
investigation will amount to a significant political act: The cooperator will be 
siding with investigators against entrenched centers of power. That choice will 
be particularly acute for “insider” witnesses who are usually insiders precisely 
because they are close to the potential suspects. For them, choosing to 
cooperate with the ICC is often a life-changing event. Some will not be 
prepared to make this choice until they are certain that the ICC is going to act, 
or until they see that the suspect is going to be arrested, or until they know if 
the suspect will be detained, or even until they see if the judges will confirm the 
charges. At the same time, some witnesses will become more afraid or deterred 
once an investigation or prosecution progresses. Thus not only is the office 
investigating in a dynamic environment, it is affecting that environment through 
its investigative actions. 
The office confronted many of these circumstances in the Libya 
investigation. As noted above, the Libya case was unexpectedly referred to the 
ICC on February 26, 2011, just eleven days after the conflict began.
115 The 
unanimous referral marked significant confidence in, and support for, the ICC, 
and many countries immediately offered to assist the office in its investigative 
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efforts.
116 At the same time, the prosecutor was justifiedly concerned that the 
support for the ICC’s work would not necessarily last (in fact it did not), and he 
also thought that the ICC had an important role to play in immediately 
deterring ongoing crimes in the conflict.
117 For those reasons, he believed that it 
was important for the office to move as quickly as possible in its investigations. 
The office faced serious witness-security challenges when beginning 
investigations. Although the eastern part of Libya quickly came under the 
control of the rebels, and many journalists and NGOs traveled to Benghazi and 
other cities in that area, the ultimate success of the rebels was far from certain.
118 
The office had to consider that if investigators interviewed witnesses in Libya 
and Gaddafi’s forces then retook control over the country, then the ICC would 
have no way of protecting those witnesses (who would no doubt be exposed as 
ICC contacts or witnesses). In addition, according to the information then 
available, even though the rebels controlled the eastern part of Libya, there 
were still Gaddafi loyalists who could threaten persons perceived as supporting 
the ICC.
119 Accordingly, at the beginning of the investigation, the office looked 
for evidence that was already outside of Libya or that was obtained by 
individuals who were able to travel into the country.
120 As a result of the 
conflict, many people, including many high-level insiders who defected, went to 
Egypt, Tunisia, other countries in the Middle East, as well as Europe.
121 In 
addition, many people who left brought out pictures, videos, and reports of 
events, as did many journalists and NGO investigators who went in and came 
out again.
122 
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http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42354835/ns/world_news-europe/t/another-senior-libyan-official-
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Many of the witnesses who left Libya were willing to talk, while some likely 
wanted to wait to see how events would unfold in Libya and who would come 
out on top.
123 Investigators had to consider that some who were implicated in 
the events but later defected might be willing to tell only part of the story, 
particularly in the early days, while others might be more forthcoming. In a 
period of approximately three months, the OTP was able to present an arrest-
warrant application to the pre-trial chamber, and warrants for Muammar 
Gaddafi, his son Saif Al-Islam, and his Military Intelligence Chief Abdullah Al-
Senussi were issued one month later.
124 The task was made easier because there 
was clear evidence that Muammar Gaddafi exercised tight control over the 
country and that the other two suspects worked closely with him.
125 The various 
military and security forces that violently suppressed the rebels would not have 
done so without clear direction from the top.
126 Evidence from witnesses, as well 
as video of Gaddafi and Saif and speeches by them, showed that the suspects 
directed the attacks on protesters.
127 
Was the prosecution’s investigation complete? No. The limited access to 
Libya made that impossible. Should the OTP have continued collecting 
evidence before bringing an arrest-warrant application? It is difficult to argue 
that this would have been a wise approach. A few months after the arrest 
warrants were issued, the Gaddafi government fell and the war was over.
128 The 
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Libyan public’s attention, and to a large extent the attention of the international 
community, turned away from what had happened during the war and towards 
rebuilding Libya, creating a new government, and enhancing security.
129 Had the 
prosecution waited, its work would have been far less relevant. 
At the time the OTP sought arrest warrants, it already had strong evidence. 
But at that time the OTP also knew, from a practical perspective, that if the 
Libyan suspects were ever arrested and brought to The Hague, additional 
evidence would then become available by way of unfettered access to Libya. 
Thus although the investigation was incomplete, the OTP could have high 
confidence that it could prove its cases to the requisite standard. 
By acting during the conflict, the court set down an important marker. The 
arrest warrants were welcomed by Gaddafi opponents within Libya.
130 
Moreover, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization war effort in Libya 
began to stall in the early summer of 2011, reports emerged that France was 
interested in negotiating a settlement.
131 The arrest warrants constrained the 
ability of international actors to consider granting any form of immunity to 
Gaddafi and his close associates. When the Gaddafi government fell, the 
existence of the warrants also served as a benchmark for the treatment of 
accused war criminals in the former regime. Although this process was not 
respected in the case of Gaddafi himself, who was captured and almost 
immediately executed by a mob, the emerging government of Libya has made a 
commitment to investigate and prosecute Saif and Al-Senussi.
132 Whether they 
succeed or not, the intervention of the ICC will serve as the standard by which 
their efforts are measured. In sum, then, it was important for the ICC to act, 
even if the investigation was not yet complete. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
All of the different situations investigated by the ICC present, and will 
continue to present, different challenges. Sometimes, all of the various factors 
will point towards support for investigation and prosecution, and the work of 
the ICC will advance in an orderly fashion, allowing the OTP to complete all of 
its investigation before the confirmation hearing or even before bringing 
charges. But in most cases the investigative practice of the ICC will necessarily 
be reactive and dynamic. It will require adjusting practice in order to respond to 
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changed circumstances and to take advantage of opportunities that arise. 
Given all of the variables and the OTP’s limited tools to control and manage 
all of the different moving parts, an overly rigid and formalistic approach that 
insists that the investigation be “complete” before arrest or confirmation is 
unwise. The procedures and process must account for the realities of practice at 
the ICC. Although the prosecution cannot investigate its case forever, and the 
rights of the defense require that it know the case that it must answer, there 
must be some flexibility in allowing the prosecution to continue its 
investigations even after confirmation in order to insure that it fulfill its 
obligation to uncover the truth. 
 